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Interests of the Sperm Donor
GEORGE J. ANNAS*
Alex Haley concludes his international best seller, Roots, with the
burial of his father in Little Rock, Arkansas. Walking away from
the graveside he ponders the past generations, observing "I feel that
they do watch and guide." The book inspired whole industries
devoted to the development of family trees, and locating one's
"roots" has become somewhat of an obsession with many. Because
of the current secrecy surrounding the practice of Artificial In-
semination Donor (AID), there are an estimated 250,000 children
conceived by AID (at the rate of 6-10,000 annually in the United
States) who will never be able to find their biological roots. There is
almost no data available on these children, their psychological
development, or their family life. The entire procedure has been
shrouded in secrecy that is primarily justified by fear of potential
legal consequences should the fact of AID be discovered.
It is the thesis of this brief paper that most of the informal "poli-
cies" concerning AID as it is presently practiced in the United
States have come about because of an exaggeration of potential
legal pitfalls and a failure to pay sufficient attention to the best
interests of the AID child. Accordingly it is at least premature
either to legislate "standards" or use AID as a "model" for In vitro-
Fertilization. Most commentary on AID has concentrated on
theoretical legal problems without paying attention to real
psychological problems. Indeed, most of the legal literature reads
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like an answer to the following exercise: "Review all of the case law
and statutes relating to AID and discuss all possible lawsuits that
any participant or product of AID might have against anyone. If
time permits, suggest a statutory scheme that might minimize these
problems."'I Rather than add another answer to this interesting but
tangential exercise, this paper will review the rationale for AID, the
manner in which donors are selected, and the way records are kept,
with a view toward developing policies and practices that maximize
the best interests of the child.2
Why Use AID?
The question of indications is almost never addressed in the medical
or legal literature beyond assuming it is almost exclusively a "treat-
ment for husband infertility." To find a model for AID one must
consult the social satirists of the twentieth century, and the writings
of philosophers. In George Orwell's 1984 reproduction by artificial
insemination (although not necessarily by donor) was mandatory as
part of a program to remove all pleasure from sexual intercourse.
Other measures enacted toward this end were Party approval of all
marriages (always refused if the couple was physically attracted
toward each other) and promotion of the view that sexual inter-
course should be seen "as a slightly disgusting minor operation, like
having an enema." All children were raised in public institutions.
1. See, e.g., Healey, J. M., Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination by Donor and Pater-
nity Testing in GENETICS AND THE LAW 203-218 (A. Milunsky & G. J. Annas, ed. 1976);
Smith, G.P., Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 127 (1968); Note, Artificial Insemination: A Parvenu Intrudes on Ancient Law, 58
YALE L.J. 426 (1949); Note, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination,
1965 Wis. L. REV. 859; Commentary, Artificial Insemination: Problems, Policies and Pro-
posals, 26 ALA. L. REV. 120 (1973); Note, The Legal Status of Artificial Insemination: A
Need For Policy Formulation, 19 DRAKE L. REV. 409 (1970); Wadlington, W., Artificial In-
semination: The Dangers of a Poorly Kept Secret, 64 NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. REV. 777
(1970); but see also, Smith, G. P., A Close Encounter of the First Kind: Artificial Insemina-
tion and an Enlightened Judiciary, 17 J. FAM. LAW 1 (1978).
2. Currently, at least fifteen states have statutes on the books that mention AID (ALASKA
STAT. § 20.20.010; ARK. STAT. ANN. Tit. 61, § 141 (c); CAL. CIV. CODE § 216 (West); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West); GA. CODE ANN. Tit. 74 § 101.1; KAN. STAT. Tit. 23 § 123-130;
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 188 (West); MD. ANN. CODE Art. 43, § 556E; N.Y. CoM. REL. LAW
§ 73 (McKinney); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1; OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 10 § 551-53 (West); OR.
REV. STAT. § 677.355-370; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. Tit. 12, § 12.03 (Vernon); VA. CODE
§ 64.1-7.1; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26. 050). All of these statutes specifically provide
that the resulting child is the natural child of the recipient's husband provided he has con-
sented to the procedure. Five states require that the consent be filed with a state agency
(Kansas, Oklahoma, Georgia, Washington, and Oregon) and six states, either directly or by
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Artificial insemination, however, is only one possible conse-
quence, not a cause, of a totalitarian state of the type envisaged by
Orwell. In this regard Joseph Fletcher is quite correct in observing
that in such a society "the modes of reproduction would be of a
relatively minor concern . . . compared to the many human values
certain to be destroyed." 3
AID is taken more seriously, and viewed with more hope than
fear, by Aldous Huxley. In Brave New World Revisited he writes
that every new advance in medicine will "tend to be offset by a cor-
responding advance in the survival rate of individuals cursed by
some genetic insufficiency . . . and with the decline of average
healthiness there may well go a decline in average intelligence."
Huxley presents one solution to this problem in his view of the ideal
society, Island. In that society AID is not mandatory, but is in fact
used by almost everyone-at least for the third child, and by most
couples who decide to have only two, for their second child. The
rationale is the one previously expounded by Huxley: to increase the
general IQ of the population instead of allowing it to gradually
decrease. In the words of his character, Vijaya:
In the early days there were a good many conscientious objectors. But now
the advantages of Al have been so clearly demonstrated, most married
couples feel that it's more moral to take a shot at having a child of superior
quality than to run the risk of slavishly reproducing whatever quirks and
defects may happen to run in the husband's family . . . we have a central
bank of superior stocks. Superior stocks of every variety of physique and
temperament.
4
implication, limit the practice of AID to physicians (California, Oklahoma, Virginia,
Washington, Alaska, and Oregon). Only two states specifically provide that the sperm donor
is not the father of the child. Oregon has the only criminal statute, making it a Class C
misdemeanor, punishable by 30 days in jail, for anyone but a physician to select sperm
donors, and for a donor to provide semen if he "(1) has any disease or defect known to him to
be transmissible by genes; or (2) knows or has reason to know he has a venereal disease." The
only state supreme court to ever rule on AID held a consenting husband liable for child sup-
port. People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 437 P.2d 495 (1968). On the
medical aspects of AID see Strickler, R.C., Keller, D.W., Warren, J.C., Artificial Insemina-
tion with Fresh Donor Semen, 293 NEw ENG. J. MED. 848 (1975); Chong, A.P., Jaymor,
M.L., Sixteen Years'Experience with Therapeutic Donor Insemination. 26 FERTILITY AND
STERILITY 791 (1975); Dixon, R.E., Buttram, V.C., Artificial Insemination Using Donor
Semen: A Review of 171 Cases, 27 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 130 (1976); Guttmacher, A.F.,
Artificial Insemination 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 566 (1969); Jackson, M.C.N., Richardson,
D.W., The Use of Fresh and Frozen Semen in Human Artificial Insemination, 9 J. Blosoc.
Sci. 251 (1977); Goss, D., Current Status of Artificial Insemination with Donor Semen. 122
AM. J. OBSTET./GYN. 246 (1975); David, A., Avidan, D., Artificial Insemination Donor:
Clinical and Psychological Aspects, 27 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 528 (1976).
3. FLETCHER. J., MORALS AND MEDICINE 134 (1954).
4. HUXLEY. A., ISLAND 193-194 (1972).
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The problems of selecting such "superior stock" have been dis-
cussed, but not resolved. H.J. Muller, for example, argued in 1935
that no intelligent and morally sensitive woman would refuse to
bear a child of Lenin-while in later versions Lenin is omitted and
Einstein, Pasteur, Descartes, Leonardo, and Lincoln are nominat-
ed. S Theodosius Dobzhansky has noted that "Muller's implied as-
sumption that there is, or can be, the ideal human genotype which
it is desirable to bestow upon everybody, is not only unappealing
but almost certainly wrong-it is human diversity that acted as a
leaven of creative effort in the past and will so act in the future. "6
This is, of course, simply an axiom of evolution and natural selec-
tion. The problem of making conscious choices is that we cannot
accurately predict what traits future generations will require for
survival.
Sociobiologists have recently identified another genetic "truth"
in the animal kingdom which may have relevance to the AID situa-
tion in man, i.e., that animals will try to maximize the spread of
their genes. In the words of Richard Dawkins, "Ideally what an in-
dividual would 'like' (I don't mean physically enjoy, although he
might) would be to copulate with as many members of the opposite
sex as possible, leaving the partner in each case to bring up the
children." 7
In this way the genes of the father are distributed maximally.
AID and sperm banking remove the previous physical limitations of
such a strategy from the human animal.
On the moral plane AID has been condemned by the Catholic
Church (primarily because masturbation is viewed as an unnatural
and evil act), and by such writers as Paul Ramsey (on the basis that
it is "an exercise of illicit dominion over man"). 8 On the other
hand, Joseph Fletcher has vigorously defended the morality of AID.
He has argued first that there is ample precedent for the practice in
the Old Testament (e.g., Deuteronomy 25:5-6, and Genesis
30:1-13) and that it is a licit means toward a highly desirable end
(parenthood for the otherwise sterile couple). His conclusions are
based on his belief that fidelity of marriage is a personal bond be-
5. RAMSEY. P., FABRICATED MAN 49 (1970).
6. Id. at 53.
7. DAWKINS, R., THE SELFISH GENE 151 (1976).
8. RAMSEY. P., supra note 5 at 48.
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tween husband and wife (not primarily a legal contract), and that
parenthood is a moral relationship with children, not a material or
merely physical one.'
Until early this year it was impossible to even speculate with any
authority on the indications for AID in contemporary medical prac-
tice. In March of 1979, however, Curie-Cohen, Luttrell and Shapiro
of the University of Wisconsin published their questionnaire survey
of AID practitioners. They located 379 practitioners of AID who
accounted for approximately 3,576 births in 1977 and who re-
sponded to a series of questions about their practices. The results of
this survey provide the only data in existence on the current practice
of AID in this country, and the survey, which will be referred to as
the "Curie-Cohen survey," will be cited extensively in this paper.10
As to indications, their survey findings are instructive: 95 percent
of the respondents reported that their primary reason for using AID
was for husband infertility. However, at least 40 percent had used
AID for other reasons: one-third had used it for fertile couples
when the husband feared transmission of a genetic disease (similar
to Huxley's Island rationale), and almost 10 percent had used it to
fertilize single women (removing sex from reproduction altogether,
and highlighting fears of many moralists). Therefore, whatever one
views as society's rationale for permitting AID to continue, it must
be recognized that a large percentage of practitioners are using it
for eugenic purposes. In addition, those that use it to fertilize single
women or members of lesbian couples are engaged in a practice that
most of society would probably condemn because of its implications
for the child and the family as a basic unit of society.
The issue of indications needs to be faced directly and clearly by
commentators and practitioners alike so that an informed consen-
sus can be reached. It is worth observing, however, that current ra-
tionale for servicing the infertile couple, the lesbian couple, and
single women all rest primarily on one's definition of the best inter-
ests of the couple or prospective parent, and not on the best inter-
ests of the child. While many physicians "screen" recipients to
determine if their motives are proper and their marriage "stable,"
9. FLETCHER. J., supra note 3, at 116-122.
10. Curie-Cohen, M., Luttrel, L.. and Shapiro, S., Current Practice of Artificial Insem-
ination by Donor in the United States. 300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 585 (1979).
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there is no evidence that they are competent to make these judg-
ments. This is not necessarily to say that AID should not be avail-
able to couples in which the husband is sterile: it is only to highlight
the fact that we have no data concerning how children born into this
situation fare, and to suggest that it is irresponsible to continue the
practice of AID for this indication without attempting to gather
such data.
Donor Selection
Donor selection may be the most difficult issue in AID, but legal
considerations are not controlling. First it should be noted that
"donor" is a misnomer. Virtually all respondents in the Curie'-
Cohen study paid forejaculates, 90 percent paying from $20 to $35
per ejaculate, with 7 percent paying more, up to $100. Thus a more
accurate term would be "sperm vendors." While this distinction
may seem trivial, it has legal consequences. For example, it makes
no sense to designate the form signed by the "vendor" as a "consent
form" since he is not a patient and isn't really consenting to any-
thing. It is a contract in which the sperm vendor agrees to deliver a
product for pay. We can debate the elements of the agreement, but
most would probably agree that it should spell out the vendor's
obligations in terms of his own physical and genetic health, includ-
ing an accurate family history, the quality of the specimens he is
required to produce, the necessity for complete and permanent
anonymity of the recipient, and a waiver of any rights in any child
resulting from the insemination. In return, the buyer agrees to pay
the vendor and protect his anonymity.
The issue of who selects the sperm vendor has been given far too
little attention. The Curie-Cohen study found two things of interest
in this regard. First, 92 percent of practitioners never permit the
recipient to select the donor, although the remainder do on rare
occasion. Also, 15 percent used frozen semen obtained from sperm
banks, and others used sperm from those selected by urologists or
other personal associates. The point is that at least in a small
minority of cases, someone other than the physician selects the
source of the sperm. More significant, however, is the fact that
almost all physicians make their own selection, most using medical
students. Sixty-two percent used medical students or hospital resi-
dents; 10 percent used other university or graduate students; 18
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percent used both, and the remaining 10 percent used donors from
military academies, husbands of obstetric patients, hospital person-
nel, and friends.
Physicians in all of these situations are making eugenic deci-
sions-selecting what they consider "superior" genes for AID. In
general they have chosen to reproduce themselves (or those in their
profession), and this is what sociobiologists like Dawkins would
probably have predicted. While this should not surprise us, it
should be a cause of concern, since what may be controlling is more
than just convenience. Physicians may believe that society needs
more individuals with the attributes of physicians, but it is unlikely
that society as a whole does. Lawyers would be likely to select law
students; geneticists, graduate students in genetics; military per-
sonnel, students at the military academies, etc. The point is not
trivial. Courts have found in other contexts that physicians have
neither the training nor the social warrant to make "quality of life"
decisions. In the Houle case, for example, a physician's decision not
to treat a defective newborn was overruled on the basis that "the
doctor's qualitative evaluation of the value of the life to be pre-
served is not legally within the scope of his expertise." Selecting
donors in this manner, rather than matching for characteristics of
the husband, for example, seems to be primarily in the best inter-
ests of the physician rather than the child, and can probably not be
justified. Nor can the argument that medical students know more
about genetics than other graduate students stand analysis. They
are probably also just as susceptible to monetary influence as are
some of the blood sellers described in Richard Tittmuss's classic
study, The Gift Relationship. Perhaps national guidelines, devel-
oped by a committee made up of a random sample of the popula-
tion, would be more appropriate.
The Curie-Cohen survey also revealed that even on the basis of
simple genetics, physicians administering AID "were not trained
for the task" and made many erroneous and inconsistent decisions.
Specifically, 80 to 95 percent of all respondents said they would
reject a donor if he had one of the following traits, and more than 50
percent of all respondents would reject the same donor if one of
these traits appeared in his immediate family: Tay-Sachs,
hemophilia, cystic fibrosis, mental retardation, Huntington's,
translocation or trisomy, diabetes, sickle-cell trait, and alkap-
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tonuria. This list includes autosomal recessive diseases in which
carriers can be identified, and those in which they cannot, domi-
nant, X-linked, and multigenic diseases.
The troubling findings are that the severity and genetic risk of the
condition were not reflected in rejection criteria, and that genetic
knowledge appears deficient. For example, 71 percent would reject
a donor who had hemophilia in his family, even though this
X-linked gene could not be transmitted unless the donor himself
were affected. Additionally, although 92 percent said they would re-
ject a donor with a translocation or trisomy, only 12.5 percent ac-
tually examined the donor's karyotype. Similarly, while 95 percent
would reject a carrier of Tay-Sachs, fewer than 1 percent actually
tested donors for this carrier state. In fact, only 29 percent per-
formed any biochemical tests on donors other than blood typing,
and these tests were primarily for communicable diseases. The con-
clusion must be that while prevention of genetic disease is a goal, it
cannot be accomplished by the means currently in use. The findings
also raise serious questions about the ability of these physicians to
act as genetic counselors, and suggest that other nonmedical profes-
sionals may be able to do a better job in delivering AID services in a
manner best calculated to maximize the interests of the child.
Since there is almost uniform agreement that certain genetic con-
ditions contraindicate use of a person's sperm for AID, it is likely
that a court would find a physician negligent in using such sperm
even though few physicians actually test to make sure the sperm
vendor is not affected.11 "There are precautions so imperative that
11. While there is no specific legal standard for screening sperm donors, when done by a
physician the general law of specialists is applicable:
One holding himself out as a specialist should be held to the standard of care and skill of
the average member of the profession practicing in the specialty, taking into account the
advances in the profession. Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 109, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798
(1968).
A recent analogous case involved an individual who received two cornea transplants. Ravenis
v. Detroit General Hospital, 63 Mich. App. 79, 234 N.W.2d 411 (1975). The transplanted
corneas turned out to be infected, and caused total and permanent blindness in the recipient.
He sued the hospital and the resident who had removed the donor's eyes. The jury found in
favor of the resident, but against the hospital. In affirming the jury's verdict against the
hospital, the court noted that while the hospital had "no printed or published checklist
which could be used as a guideline for determining the suitability of a prospective donor"
there was testimony that published criteria did exist and was "fairly uniform throughout the
nation." The court further concluded that had this criteria been applied to the donor in this
case, the jury could have rightfully decided that he would have been rejected:
The jury heard expert testimony to the effect that cadavers with a history of certain types of
illnesses are not generally wise choices for cornea donation. It follows that whoever may
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even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.""2
This is an area in which uniform standards need to be developed
within the profession.
Two other related issues concerning the donor or sperm vendor
merit mention because they have apparently been dealt with strictly
on the basis of fear of legal liability rather than any social or medi-
cal rationale or concern for the best interests of the child: consent of
the donor's wife and record keeping.
The Donor's Wife
The American Medical Association, the British Medical Society,
and authorities in Australia all agree, as do almost all legal com-
mentators, that the wife of the sperm donor must sign the
''consent" form "because marital interests are involved." None of
these sources or commentators, however, provides any further ex-
planation. This type of advice can be viewed as a paradigm of legal-
ism based on fear and ignorance.
I do not know what the original source of this recommendation is,
but it may be Joseph Fletcher's comments in 1954: ". . . it is clearly
a requirement of personal integrity, of love and loyalty, that the
donor's wife should be consulted by him (the donor) and agree to
the role he plays." 13 Perhaps. But however one comes out on this
pronouncement, it is not a legal requirement, and does not seem to
serve any useful social purpose. In terms of liability on the part of
the physician, the potential grounds appear to be two: (1) an action
in contract to recover a portion of the money received by the hus-
band for his sperm on the grounds that the wife has a property
interest in her husband's sperm; and (2) an action for alienation of
affections by the wife against the physician on the basis that her
have had the responsibility of determining the suitability of the cornea for transplant
would have been required, in the exercise of due care, to review carefully and exhaustively
the medical history of the proposed donor. . . .The jury could have determined that
Detroit General was negligent in failing to set up a procedure which could assure that the
party responsible for determining the suitability of the cornea for transplant would have
access to all the relevant medical records of the proposed donor. (emphasis supplied)
Applied to AID donors, this case indicates that hospitals and physicians are responsible for
determining the suitability of donors and, if they don't have a reasonable policy of their own,
will be held to whatever policy has been accepted by other professionals engaged in the same
activity.
12. T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1032); and see Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d
514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
13. Fletcher, J., supra note 3, at 129.
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husband prefers masturbation for pay to intercourse with her, or
some other fantasy he may have developed that interferes with the
marriage. Both of these strike me as being too silly to worry about,
and any woman who would bring either action is not likely to be
discouraged by the fact that she has signed a "consent" (read con-
tract) form. In addition, such a requirement is at odds with more
recent United States Supreme Court decisions that refuse to permit
one spouse to have veto power over procreation decisions made by
the other spouse. Specifically, a husband may not be required to
consent to his wife's abortion by state law because her right to make
this decision is constitutionally protected. 4
Record Keeping
While the Curie-Cohen survey found that 93 percent of physicians
kept permanent records on recipients, only 37 percent kept per-
manent records on children born after AID (fewer than the 50 per-
cent who provided obstetric care for their inseminated patients),
and only 30 percent kept any permanent records on donors. More-
over, 83 percent opposed any legislation that would mandate the
keeping of records because it would make protection of anonymity
of the donor more difficult. The fear of record keeping seems to be
based primarily on the idea, common in the legal literature, that if
identifiable, the donor might be sued for parental obligations (e.g.,
child support, inheritance, etc.) by one of his "biological children"
sired by the AID process, and that this suit might be successful.
The underlying rationale is that without anonymity assured, there
would be no donors. There are a number of responses to this argu-
ment: (1) It is important to maintain careful records to see how the
sperm "works" in terms of outcome of the pregnancy. If a donor is
used more than once, a defective child should be grounds for im-
mediately discontinuing the use of the sperm for the protection of
potential future children. Since the survey disclosed that most phy-
sicians have no policy on how many times they use an individual
donor, and 6 percent had used one for more than 15-with one
using a donor for 50 pregnancies-this issue is much more likely to
affect the life of a real child than the highly speculative lawsuit is to
affect a donor. (2) No meaningful study of the characteristics of
14. For a fuller discussion of this issue see Glantz, L., Recent Developments in Abortion
Law in GENETICS AND THE LAW II (A. Milunsky & G. J. Annas, ed. 1980).
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donors can ever be made if there are no records kept concerning
them. (3) In those cases where family history is important (and it is
important enough to ask every donor about his) the AID child will
never be able to respond accurately. (4) Finally, and most impor-
tantly, if no records are kept, the child will never, under any cir-
cumstances, be able to determine its genetic father. Since we do not
know what the consequences of this will be, it cannot be said that
destroying this information is in the best interests of the child. The
most that can be said for such a policy is that it is in the best inter-
ests of the donor. But this is simply not good enough. The donor has
a choice in the matter, the child has none. The donor and physician
can take steps to guard their own best interests, the child cannot.
Given the recent history of adopted children, it is likely that if
AID children learn they are the products of AID, they will want to
be able to identify their genetic father. It is now relatively accepted
practice to tell adopted children that they are adopted as soon as
possible, and make sure they understand it. This is because it is
thought they will inevitably find out some day, and the blow will be
a severe one if they have been lied to. In AID, the consensus seems
to be not to tell on the basis that no one is ever likely to find out the
truth, since to all the world it appears that the pregnancy proceeded
in the normal course.
Moralists would probably agree with Fletcher that the physician
should not accept the suggestion that a husband's brother be used
as a donor without the wife's knowledge (his intent is to keep the
blood line in his children) because this is a violation of "marital
confidence." It seems to me a similar argument can be made for
consistently lying to the child-i.e., that it is a violation of parental-
child confidence. There is evidence that AID children do learn the
truth, and the only thing all fifteen states with legislation on AID
agree on is that it should legitimize the child-an issue that will
never arise unless the child's AID status is discovered. If AID is
seen as a loving act for the child's benefit, there seems no reason to
taint the procedure with a lie that could prove extremely destructive
to the child.
A number of policies would have to be changed to permit open
disclosure of genetic parenthood to children. The first is relatively
easy: a statute could be enacted requiring the registration of all AID
children in a court in a sealed record that would only be available to
the child; the remainder of the statute would provide that the
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genetic father had no legal or financial rights or responsibilities to
the child. A variation on this would be to keep the record sealed
until the death of the donor, or until he waived his right to privacy
in this matter. In the long term, a more practical solution may lie in
only using the frozen sperm of deceased donors. In this case full
disclosure could be made without any possibility of personal or
financial demands on the genetic father by the child. Is
Worry about donors, in any event, is probably out of proportion
to reality. There have been no suits against any donor by any child
even though almost one-third of physicians engaging in AID keep
permanent records of the donors. No matter what steps are taken to
protect them, it seems essential to me that, in the potential best in-
terests of the child, such records be kept and that their contents be
based on the development of professional standards for such
records.
Not keeping records can also lead to other bizarre practices. For
example, some physicians use multiple donors in a single cycle to
obscure the identity of the genetic father. The Curie-Cohen survey
found that 32 percent of all physicians utilize this technique which
could be to the physical detriment of the child (and potential future
of a donor with defective sperm) and cannot be justified on any
genetid grounds whatsoever.16
Summary and Conclusions
Current AID practices are based primarily on consideration of pro-
tecting the interests of practitioners and donors rather than recipi-
ents and children. The most likely reason for this is found in exag-
gerated fears of legal pitfalls. It is suggested that policy in this area
should be dictated by maximizing the best interests of the resulting
children. The evidence from the Curie-Cohen survey is that current
practices are dangerous to children and must be modified. Spe-
cifically, consideration should be given to the following:
1. removing AID from the practice of medicine and placing it in
the hands of genetic counselors or other nonmedical personnel
15. Sperm banks may soon be able to market sperm directly to consumers, bypassing
physicians and adding to current confusion in practice. See Advertising Age, May 14, 1979,
at 30.
16. A more encouraging finding was that only two physicians in the entire sample mixed
donor sperm with the husband's semen. This apparently once common practice has died,
probably because it is now known to be medically contraindicated. See Quinlivan, W.L.G.,
Sullivan, H., Spermatozoal Antibodies in Human Seminal Plasma as a Cause of Failed Ar-
tificial Donor Insemination, 28 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 1082-85 (1977).
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(alternatively, a routine genetic consultation could be added for
each couple who request AID);
2. development of uniform standards for donor selection, includ-
ing national screening criteria;
3. a requirement that practitioners of AID keep permanent
records on all donors that they can match with recipients; I would
prefer this to become common practice in the profession, but legis-
lation requiring filing with a governmental agency may be neces-
sary;
4. as a corollary, mixing of sperm would be an unacceptable
practice; and the number of pregnancies per donor would be
limited;
5. establishment of national standards regarding AID by profes-
sional organizations with input from the public;
6. research on the psychological development of children who
have been conceived by AID and their families.
Dr. S.J. Behrman concludes his editorial on the Curie-Cohen
survey by questioning the "uneven and evasive" attitude of the law
in regard to AID, and recommending immediate legislative action:
The time has come-in fact, is long overdue-when legislatures must set
standards for artificial insemination by donors, declare the legitimacy of the
children, and protect the liability of all directly involved with this procedure.
A better public policy on this question is clearly needed."
I have suggested that agreement with the need for "a better
public policy" is not synonymous with immediate legislation. The
problem with AID is that there are many unresolved problems with
AID, and few of them are legal. There is no social or professional
agreement on indications, selection of donors, screening of donors,
mixing of donor sperm, or keeping records on sperm donations.
Where there is agreement, such as in requiring the signature of the
donor's wife on a "consent" form, the reasons for such agreement
are unclear.
It is time to stop thinking about uniform legislation and start
thinking about the development of professional standards. Obses-
sive concern with self-protection must give way to concern for the
child. "
17. Behrman, S.J., Artificial Insemination and Public Policy, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED.
619-620 (1979).
18. The argument is not based on any alleged action for "wrongful life" that the child may
have (I do not believe this would ever be recognized by a court in the absence of legislation),
but on the theory that we should do what we can to protect the interests of "innocent" third
parties whenever their interests are in conflict with those who have the ability to affect them.

